results over time was cost inefficiency. 1 We present those results here.
This study demonstrates that a temporally consistent contributing factor to a firm's risk of takeover is the relatively inefficient use of resources, and that the combination of firms in a takeover results in the ex post improvement in cost efficiency as measured by the cost per unit of revenue. The bearing of cost inefficiency on the risk of takeover and the resulting improvements in cost efficiency appear to be remarkably stable over the nearly two decades examined.
The paper also investigates the effect of firm size on the risk of takeover. Prior analyses of takeovers suggest and often find that size has a negative effect on the risk of takeover. (See, for example, Singh (1975) and Hasbrouck (1985) .) This negative effect of size on risk has been attributed to the difficulties in financing large takeover transactions. However, size may also have a positive effect on risk. The specification of our model, therefore, has been designed to test for such a possibility. Since the cost variable includes overhead costs, and post-takeover cost restructuring is likely to entail economies of scale, the marginal increase in size tends to enhance the potential for post-takeover savings in cost per unit of revenue. Thus, the effect of size on the risk of takeover can be positive or negative. It is also expected to vary over time depending on the accessibility of financing for corporate control activity and the relative strength of the opposing effects. Evidence consistent with this interpretation is presented: while the effect of firm size on the risk of takeover is always significant, the magnitude and the sign of this effect are significantly different across the sample period.
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The literature on takeovers has predominately used logistic and probit regressions to analyze takeover data. 3 These techniques estimate the probability of takeover over a fixed period as a function of a firm's characteristics at the beginning of the period. As such, these techniques are not suitable for an investigation of the temporal profile of risk. This paper employs the Cox regression model, which is particularly appropriate for the study of a time-varying risk profile.
The Cox model is a dynamic technique that incorporates time-dependent covariates and estimates the hazard rate of takeover at any time during the study period as a function of these covariates. To study the ex post effect of takeovers, this study uses fixed-effects panel data models that control for how firms performed before the takeover occurred.
This paper is organized into six sections. The first section summarizes prior studies on takeovers. The second section describes the sample, defines the efficiency measure and looks briefly at descriptive statistics for our analysis of the ex ante determinants of takeover risk. The third section introduces the Cox regression model and discusses the results of estimations of alternative specifications of models for the risk of takeover. The fourth section describes the modifications made to the data set for our analysis of the ex post effect of takeovers on firm performance. The fifth section applies the fixed-effects panel data model and presents the results of regressions for models of the takeover effect on firm performance. The final section concludes.
Literature Review
The debate about the determinants and effects of takeovers in the United States is rekindled with the peak of each new wave of takeovers. And with each new wave of takeover studies come additional conflicting results. This section does not give an exhaustive review of the literature on takeovers. Rather, it provides a sampling of those that assumed to study the same phenomenon but arrived at different conclusions. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) argue that prior to the 1980s, target firms were often more profitable than non-target firms. Billett (1996) suggests that from 1977-1986, they were equally profitable, and Cheh, Weinberg and Yook (1999) present evidence that in [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] targets were less profitable than non-target firms. Using various measures of market valuation as a proxy for performance (market-to-book, Tobin's q, etc.), some studies report that prior to and during the 1980s, the performance of targets was not significantly different from non-target firms (Mueller (1980) and Palepu (1986) ); (Powell (1997) , Ambrose and Megginson (1992) and Cudd and Duggall (2000)). Still others report a relatively lower valuation for target firms in the 1980s (Hasbrouck (1985) , Mörck et. al. (1989) , Davis and Stout (1992) and Cheh, Weinberg and Yook (1999) ).
In ex post examinations, Meeks (1977) finds no consistent change in performance resulting from takeovers, whereas Mueller (1980), and Ravenscraft and Sherer (1987) , find a significant deterioration in performance. 4 Three later studies -Healy et. al. (1992 ), Lichtenberg (1992 , and Switzer (1996) -find significant ex post performance improvements resulting from takeovers.
5
Given the lack of consistent evidence in aggregate data sets, empirical researchers turned to sorting takeovers into different events. The suggestion was that the true determinants of the probability of takeover were masked within these sub-categories. Most notably, Mörck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) separated targets by "mood", determined by the target's reaction to the first bid received before it was taken over. Rejection of a takeover offer was hypothesized to be the action of poor performing managers protecting their jobs. Categorical divisions of takeovers also did not produce consistent empirical results. The targets of hostile takeovers are reported to be poor performers (Mörck, Shleifer and Vishny 1988, Martin and McConnell 1991) , better performers (Herman and Lowenstein 1988, Powell 1997) and not different from other firms (Davis and Stout 1992, Kennedy and Limmack 1996) . Analyses separating ex post profitability by the "mood" of the takeover produce similar conflicts (Fowler and Schmidt 1989 , Healy et. al. 1992 , Powell 1997 . The theories and evidence of the implications for target management dismissals (another definition of "hostile") on ex post performance are also mixed. (Cannella & Hambrick (1993) provide a summary of eight arguments, with predicted results of negative, positive and neutral, along with a bibliography of empirical findings.) Empirical studies using another popular categorization (relatedness of target and buyer industry) show variously that relatedness decreases ex post shareholder returns (Agrawal et.al. 1992) , improves ex post returns (Kusewitt 1985) or has no significant effect (Fowler and Schmidt 1989, Cannella and Hambrick 1993) .
Whether the debate will be resolved through the use of new or better performance measures, more advanced methodology or unidentified categorizations remains to be seen. The present research seeks to contribute both methodology and measurement to the debate on the determinants and effects of takeovers in the United States.
Data for the Ex Ante Analysis
This study is based on a sample of U.S. corporations included in the Fortune 500 ranking at least one year between 1980 and 1997. Separate methodologies were applied to our analysis of the determinants and the effects of takeovers thus, certain modifications to the data set were necessary for the ex post analysis. These are discussed later. The following describes the overall sample and the construction of data observations applicable to both studies generally and the ex ante analysis specifically.
Sample and Data Description
The Compustat files contained 1,092 firms that ranked in the Fortune 500 at least one year between 1980 and 1997. After excluding non-publicly traded companies 6 and financial firms from the study, 938 firms remained. Takeovers -defined as a transaction in which one firm is subsumed into another, i.e., where a complete change of ownership occurs -were tracked each year from 1981 through 1997. 7 318 firms were identified as targets.
All performance data from 1980 through 1996 are taken from the Compustat files. For 57 targets, data for the year prior to takeover came from Moody's Industrial Manuals and SEC reports, when it was not available in Compustat. Industry adjustments are based on the median performance for each year of firms in the Compustat files with the same 2-digit SIC code. We required a minimum of 10 observations for each industry-year for the industry adjustments.
Lack of industry medians reduced the sample to 896 firms and 276 takeovers. Our data set contains 10,784 observations.
Each firm was assigned to one of six sectors based on its industry: basic resources, cyclical consumer products, non-cyclical consumer products, energy, industrial, and technology.
The sectors follow the definitions used in the Dow Jones Stoxx Index and are used to control for sector-specific effects on firm performance and the risk of takeover.
It is worth noting the difference between the 2-digit SIC code industries and the broader sectors. SIC industry codes, even at the 2-digit level, are specific enough that different codes are assigned, for example, to clothing wholesalers and clothing manufacturers. Sectors, on the other hand, gather all firms in the clothing industry together (cyclical consumer products). The industry adjustment is meant to make firm performance comparable across industries. In summary, a striking feature of the data is that the performance of targets and nontargets varies over time. This suggests that a successful modeling of the risk of takeover requires not only the use of performance measures that best capture the performance gap between targets and non-targets, but also, and even more importantly, the use of statistical models and specifications that allow for changing effects over time of performance measures and other covariates on the risk of takeover.
The Cox Regression Model
This study employs the hazards regression model proposed by Cox (1972) as its statistical model. This model gained enormous popularity in the analysis of survival data in biostatistics for the features discussed below. Since takeover data in our study can be interpreted as survival data, the Cox regression model offers a powerful tool for modeling the dependence of the risk of takeover on firms' characteristics, and of the evolution of that risk over time. (An exhaustive discussion of the Cox regression model may be found in Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) , Fleming and Harrington (1991) and Andersen et al.(1993) . The first reference provides the most accessible discussion, whereas the other two are more mathematically demanding.)
Most studies use logistic and probit regressions to analyze takeover data. Those models estimate the probability of takeover over a fixed period of time as a function of a firm's characteristics at the beginning of the period. As such, these techniques are not suitable for the temporal profile of risk investigated here. The Cox model estimates the hazard rate of takeover at any time of the study period as a function of the history of time-dependent characteristics of a firm. It allows for the possibility of changing effects of these characteristics over time, as well as for the dependence of the effects on the levels of these characteristics.
The other notable feature of the Cox regression model, as compared with the logit and probit models, is that it accommodates right censored and left-truncated takeover times. The logit and probit models dichotomize the sample by a takeover outcome within the study period.
However, the firm that has not experienced a takeover during the period of the study may be taken over within a year of the end of study. Thus inconsistent conclusions are likely to result merely from differences in the end points of the studies. 18 In contrast, the Cox model considers such a firm as not having yet experienced a takeover, that is, as having a right-censored takeover time. The Cox model also accommodates delayed entry (left-truncated takeover times), that is, it does not require that all firms in the sample be followed from the beginning of the study. That requirement would have excluded over 200 firms from our sample. 19 These features make the Cox model particularly suitable for studying the variation of takeover risk over time.
Description of The Model
Our relatively brief exposition of the Cox model is in the context of the takeover data.
Assume that all firms in our sample are at risk for takeover and let T i , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, be the time to takeover (survival time) of the i'th firm in the sample. For this study we identify time 0 as year 1980, and thus the time to takeover is measured relative to year 1980. The time to takeover of the i'th firm is assumed to depend on a vector {X * i (t), 0<t<T i } of its time-dependent characteristics or covariates. In the Cox model, the relation between the time to takeover and the covariates is modeled by specifying the form of the conditional hazard function of a takeover time. The conditional hazard function of a takeover time T i , λ(t|X i (t)), for given covariates, is defined by
It is seen from (1) that for small ∆t
and thus λ(t|X i (t)) is approximately the probability that a firm experiences a takeover just after time t given survival until time t and given the covariates X i (t). Here X i (t) may be any suitable function of the history of covariates up until time t, {X * i (t), 0 < t < T i }, but in most applications of the hazard models it is assumed that the hazard of failure at time t depends on the current values of the covariates, i. e., that X i (t) = X * i (t). Our specification of X i (t) involves lagged values of the covariates and is discussed below. The Cox hazard regression model specifies the following form for the conditional hazard function
where β′ = (β 1 , …, β k ) is a vector of unknown regression coefficients, λ 0 (t) is an unknown and unspecified baseline hazard function, and β′X i (t) is an inner product.
An important aspect of the Cox model is that, at any point in time, the ratio of the hazard rates of takeover for two different firms does not involve the baseline hazard function.
Consequently, in the case of time independent covariates, the ratio of hazard rates stays constant over time. For this reason, the Cox regression model is often referred to as the proportional (1) hazards model. The parameter exp(β p ) represents a relative change in the hazard rate resulting from a one unit increase in the value of the p'th covariate, holding all other covariates constant,
The baseline hazard function, λ 0 (t), gives the hazard rate for a firm with covariates equal to 0.
Since we use the cyclical consumer products sector as a baseline and we do not adjust the size variable, λ 0 (t) exp(β size Size) represents the hazard rate of a takeover faced by a firm in the cyclical consumer products sector of a given size, performing at its industry medians for all other performance measures.
The parameters of the Cox regression model are λ 0 (t) and the regression coefficients β. Cox (1972) proposed the partial likelihood method for the estimation of β. The essential feature of the method is that it does not involve the baseline hazard function λ 0 (t), that is, parameter β can be estimated in the absence of knowledge of λ 0 (t). The baseline hazard function is estimated subsequently in a nonparametric fashion. Since in this study our interest is in the estimation of the relative risk of takeover faced by the firms, we discuss partial likelihood estimation of regression coefficients β, below. For a discussion of the estimation methods of λ 0 (t) we refer the reader to the aforementioned references.
Takeover Data and Estimation
For takeover data, as is typical for survival data in general, we do not observe the takeover times (i. e., survival times) for all firms and, furthermore, some firms may not be observed from the beginning of the study. Thus, for the i'th firm the observed data consist of the entry time V i ≥ 0, exit time, min (T i , T ), which is either a takeover time T i , or the end of study time, T, whichever is smaller, and the covariate history { X
denote ordered observed takeover times. Let (k) be the label for a firm experiencing a takeover at T (k) , so the covariate history associated with label (k) is { X (
T )}. Given these data and assuming that takeover times are all distinct, the regression coefficients, β, are estimated by the value β which maximizes the partial likelihood
Here R k is the set of firms at risk of a takeover just before time T (k) , that is,
We see that the partial likelihood is formed by taking the product over all takeover times.
The k'th factor in this product:
, is the conditional probability that the firm with covariates X (k) (T (k) ) is taken over at T (k) given that the firms in R k are at risk and that exactly one takeover occurs at T (k) . We note that a firm that has not experienced a takeover during the time of the study contributes to the partial likelihood by its presence in some or all of the risk sets. Even though the partial likelihood L(β) is not a likelihood function in the usual sense, it can be treated as an ordinary likelihood function for purposes of inference about β. Thus, under mild conditions β is asymptotically normally distributed with a covariance matrix that can be consistently estimated using either the usual matrix of second derivatives of L(β) or, as is the case in this study, using the robust estimator of (2) based on likelihood ratio methods.
The derivation of the partial likelihood in (2) is based on the assumption that takeover times are continuous random variables and thus that no ties occur among takeover times.
However, in many studies, including ours, time is measured discretely, which results in the presence of ties. 20 When ties are present the following approximate partial likelihood has been proposed. As before, let T (1) < T (2) < ... < T (L) be the ordered takeover times. Let d k be the number of takeovers at T (k) , and let D k be the set of firms that are taken over at T (k) . The approximate partial likelihood is given by
) and, as before, R k is the risk set at T (k) . If there are ties, the regression coefficients, β, are estimated by the value β which maximizes (3). The approximate partial likelihood is accurate if, for all k, the number of ties, d k , is small relative to the size of the risk set R k . It can be seen from figure 1 and table A-2 that this condition is satisfied for our data; the ratio of the number of takeovers to the number of firms at risk is always less than 0.05, and at most takeover times it is not greater than 0.03.
In computing (3), we assume that
, that is, we assume, that the hazard of failure at T (k) depends on the values of covariates at time T (k) -1. This is a natural assumption for our data: since performance measures are not available for the year in which a firm experiences a takeover, we use instead the last available values of performance measures from the year preceding the year of takeover.
In our application the Cox regression model is implemented using STATA (StataCorp.
(1997)).
The Results: Size and Cost Inefficiency as Determinants of Takeover Risk
Extensive statistical analysis of the model specification in Trimbath (2000a) suggests that the effects of size and cost on the risk of takeover depend on the magnitudes of these variables.
Thus, the specification of our hazard model uses two size variables: one for larger firms whose size is above the sample median, and one for smaller firms whose size is below the sample median. In addition to the continuous cost variable, we include a dummy variable for firms with costs above their industry median.
Statistical analysis in Trimbath (2000a) also suggests a structural change in the parameters of the model across time. 21 We therefore allow for a temporal change in the parameters of the model in 1988. We anticipate changes in capital markets to affect the impact of size on risk across time, whereas we expect cost efficiency to be temporally stable.
In addition to costs and size, our specification includes dummy variables indicating a firm's sector. Beyond controlling for sectoral effects, these variables can also be interpreted as capturing the role of the takeover mechanism in reallocating resources across sectors. Since sectoral effects capture a complex process of the reallocation of resources through takeovers across sectors, we also do not expect them to remain stable over time. Changes in the economic environment, such as shifts in global trade or consumer demand as well as technical progress, are likely to affect the sector-related risk of takeover. Since these changes are inherently dynamic, we expect sectoral dummies to be temporally unstable. Prior studies of takeovers have suggested and often found that size has a negative effect on the risk of takeover. This negative effect of size on risk has been attributed to the difficulties in financing larger takeover transactions (for example, see Singh (1975) and Hasbrouck (1985) ).
However, the cost variable includes overhead costs, and thus the marginal increase in size enhances the potential for post-takeover gains in cost per unit of revenue. This implies that the effect of size on the risk of takeover might be either negative or positive and, in general, should be expected to vary over time depending on the relative strengths of these two opposing effects.
In particular, during the periods in which financing of takeover transactions is relatively easy, the effect of size on risk is expected to be less negative -and perhaps even positive -as compared with the periods in which financing of takeovers is substantially more difficult. As discussed next, the 1980s were characterized by relatively easier access to financing for takeovers. Thus, we would expect the sign and magnitude of the size coefficient to change over time. The results in table 3 are consistent with this interpretation.
Although an extensive analysis of a significantly more negative effect of size on the risk of takeovers during 1989-96, as compared with 1980-88, is beyond the scope of this paper, 22 an explanation based on the changing costs and availability of financing of takeovers appears to have some plausibility. The early part of the 1980s included the introduction and rapid growth of the "junk bond era" of takeover financing. 23 That era was also characterized by an antitrust environment favorable to large takeovers. By 1989, both the Federal Reserve and Congress had placed restrictions on "junk bonds" raising the cost of financing for large takeovers.
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To gauge the numerical impact of the changing effect of size on risk, we consider two hypothetical firms with the same industry-adjusted cost per unit of revenue and in the same sector. Suppose that firm A had a size equal to the median of the sample in both subperiods: as they were at the time of takeover. Since all firms in the sample grew between the two subperiods, we further assume that the four selected firms would have grown between the two subperiods at the same rate as the median firm. 25 The actual targets presented in table 4 illustrate that, due to the changing size effect, the risk of takeover faced by large cost-inefficient firms declined precipitously in the 1990s as compared with the 1980s.
Data for the Ex post Analysis
We continue our study using the same sample of firms for the ex post analysis as used in the analysis of the ex ante determinants of the risk of takeovers. To examine the impact of takeovers on the efficient use of resources, we matched pairs of firms combined in takeovers. In what follows, we describe the modifications made to prepare our data set for the ex post analysis.
Sample and Data Description
For our analysis of the ex post effect of takeovers, we included any firm that was a partner in a takeover with our sample of Fortune 500 firms (i.e., firms that were buyers of or targets to firms in the sample). Firms not involved in takeovers and those without publicly traded partners were deleted from the sample. We were able to match 213 pairs merged through takeovers. Lack of data reduced our final sample to 165 pairs. For these, one additional firm was added as a buyer and 75 as targets; 86 pairs are made entirely from firms used in the ex ante analysis. Figure 2 shows the relative size of the targets and buyers as measured by net sales ($millions, 1980) .
We use data from 1977 through 1996 for takeovers completed from 1981 through 1995. Table A -2 displays the number of pairs in the study by the year of their merger. The database in this section has 1,940 observations. Our ex ante benchmark is the pro forma (combined) performance of the target and buyer firms, following the same procedure used in Meeks (1977 ), Healy et. al. (1992 and others, including weighted industry adjustments. This allows us to measure economic gains in the use of the combined resources that can be attributed to the takeover.
Although our regression analysis will account for temporal changes relating to the period in which a takeover occurred, the following descriptive statistics use all available data by year of takeover. We make the general distinction between ex ante and ex post observations. As shown in table 5, the mean ex ante costs of the takeover pairs was 3 percent below industry (1 percent at the median). The mean ex post cost per unit of revenue in the sample was 6 percent below industry (4 percent at the median). While the univariate statistics are in no way conclusive, they are indicative of an important improvement in efficiency (reduction in costs) that could be attributable to the combination of firms in takeovers. Overall, the buyers are the lower cost firm in the majority of pairs (62 percent, measured at the year before the takeover is completed). In the majority of those pairs (55 percent), the target's costs are above industry median.
The Fixed Effects Model
Using fixed effects models in the manner usually applied in sociology studies, we sought to estimate the effect of takeover on firm performance, measuring changes from pre-takeover performance to post-takeover performance in the context of our data setting (see Allison 1994) .
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Description of the Model
We begin with the following specification of the fixed effects model. Let i index individual pairs, t index time relative to the takeover, and let Y it be the cost efficiency measure for pair i.
X it is the treatment variable, equal to one after the pair has combined in a takeover, and ε it is the error term. 27 The α i 's represent differences across pairs that are constant over time and can be thought of as summarizing the effects on Y of all unmeasured, stable characteristics of the pairs.
The fixed effects specification in (4) assumes that pairs have unique distributions of unobservable characteristics that influence performance outcomes and is intended to control for differences in such characteristics between pairs.
The coefficients of primary interest are the β's that measure the performance contrasts between ex ante and ex post performance; we term them the takeover effects. These measure the effect of the takeover on Y it that is common to all pairs (cross-sectional units). We estimate these effects for (i) all pairs combined in takeovers, (ii) pairs combined in different time periods.
The ε it 's are the "usual" residual; the serially uncorrelated, transitory component of performance. The ε variables represent time-specific random disturbances that are assumed to be independent of the measured explanatory variables, of α i , and of each other.
The fixed effects estimator controls for all stable differences across individuals, whether or not those differences are correlated with measured variables. The pair-specific effect (α i ) is identified and isolated, thereby removing omitted-variable bias from the parameter estimates.
This OLS method may not adequately deal with autocorrelation among the repeated observations. However, if the major component of these correlations is attributable to stable differences across pairs, the fixed effects estimator will probably correct for much of the crosstime correlation. Greater variation across individuals is more likely to result in greater correlation across the Y it 's; this effect is adequately captured in the α i 's.
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The Results: Takeover Effect on Cost Efficiency
The takeover effect on costs is considered first in a regression representing the overall effect using one dummy variable for all ex post observations. This model identifies the effect of takeovers that is uniform for all pairs. Second, we use dummy variables for ex post observations on takeovers completed in the subperiods 1981-1989 and 1990-1995 . These periods were identified as having significantly different determinants of the risk of takeover. The results are reported in table 6.
There are significant cost efficiency gains in the post-takeover years. Across time, the efficiency gains are not statistically different (p = 0.97). 28 Our analysis indicates significant improvements in efficiency for firms combined in takeovers. These gains are temporally stable.
Finally, to complete our analysis, we separate the marginal takeover effect in the same way as we did the takeover determinants. As shown in the bottom portion of table 6, takeovers resulted in significantly larger ex post improvements when the targets were larger (p = 0.041) and where targets were inefficient relative to their industry (p = 0.002).
Conclusion
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that a corporation faces a higher risk of takeover if it is relatively inefficient. Our variable capturing the cost inefficiency, relative to industry benchmarks, is temporally stable and thus we suggest it should be included in the specification of models of the risk of takeover. Furthermore, an examination of the takeover effect on the ex post performance of paired firms demonstrates a significant improvement in cost efficiency which is, again, stable across time. 29 We further demonstrate that the contribution of size as a risk factor can be affected by exogenous changes in the economic environment (likely due to changes in the capital markets).
Our on-going research will produce a continuously updated database of takeovers, which can be used to identify additional temporal changes that may occur after the end of the current study.
Lastly, we show that size can be a positive contributing factor to risk when we consider the potential gains that could motivate takeovers.
Powell, Ronan G., "Modeling Takeover 1980-88 and 1989-1996 . Cost is industry adjusted, calculated as firm minus the industry median, where industry median is matched on 2-digit SIC code and year of observation. The table entries are then the medians of those industry-adjusted averages of observations for firms. The target medians are bold where they are significantly different from non-targets in the same observation subperiod (1980-88 or 1989-1996) . Size is measured as revenue (net sales, $millions, 1980) . Cost is the (cost of goods sold plus selling, general and administrative expenses) per unit of revenue (%). Number of 1990-97 targets (63) that we have observations for in the subperiod 1989-96 is smaller than the actual number of 1990-97 targets (78), due to delayed entry of 15 firms. ***, **, and * indicate Wilcoxon rank sum statistics significant at 1, 5 and 10 percent, respectively.
Table 3 Size and Cost Inefficiency and the Risk of Takeover
We estimate the risk of takeover based on size and costs using the Cox proportional hazard model with robust standard errors (Lin and Wei, 1989) . Coefficients are the change in the logs-odds per unit. Standard errors are in parentheses, significant coefficients are bold-faced. Standard errors are adjusted for clustering on the firm identifier. Size is measured as revenue (net sales, $millions, 1980) . Size is split according to the medians of the sample in respective subperiods. Cost is the (cost of goods sold plus selling, general and administrative expenses) per unit of revenue (%). Costs are adjusted for median performance in the same 2-digit SIC code industry and year. Cost above industry is a dummy variable equal one if the firm's cost is greater than the industry median, zero otherwise. Dummy variables for the economic sectors in each subperiod were included in the regression, but only significant coefficients are reported. Sector dummy variables are equal to one if the firm is in that sector and the observation is in that subperiod, zero otherwise. All models estimated using 896 firms, 276 takeovers and 10,784 observations. Table 5 Ex Ante and Ex Post Performance of Pairs This table shows the pre-takeover performance based on pro forma combined target and buyer. The post-takeover performance is based on the combined firm after takeover. Cost is adjusted for 2-digit SIC code industry median in the year of observation. Cost is the (cost of goods sold plus selling, general and administrative expenses) per unit of revenue (%). Results of fixed-effects panel data models for the takeover effect on cost efficiency. The dependent variable is the cost per unit of revenue of firms that were combined in takeovers, with the treatment variable being equal to one for ex post observations (and limited alternately to the period of the takeover, the target's size relative to the sample median and the target's costs relative to its industry). Standard errors are in parentheses and significant coefficients are bold-faced. Pair effects (not reported here) are within pair. Costs are adjusted for 2-digit SIC code industry median in year of observation, weighted for the relative size of the target and buyer in the pair (if they were in different industries at the time of the takeover). Efficiency is measured as cost per unit of revenue (calculated as costs of goods sold plus selling, general and administrative expenses as a percent of sales). This table gives the number of firms in the study for each year. The date is the year of observation for the sample used in the ex ante analysis and the year of the takeover for the sample used in the ex post analysis. Data on targets ends in the year before the takeover was completed. Hence, the 13 targets listed for Date 1980 were taken over in 1981, etc. The column total denotes the total number of firms in the sample. The number of firms each year differs from the total since some firms do not survive for the entire sample period and some firms enter with delay. 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 Date Hazard Rate (%) Figure 2 
Cost
Relative Size of Paired Targets and Buyers
The average size of targets relative to their buyers shown in the figure is calculated using Net Sales (revenue) in millions of 1980 dollars for each year. The date is the year the takeovers were completed. Frydman and Frydman (2000) , we interpret our results following the distinction between the relative predictability of gains from revenue and cost restructuring, as advanced in the context of privatization in transition economies by Grosfeld and Roland (1997) , Frydman, et al (1999) and Frydman, Hessel, and Rapaczynski (2000) . We also conjecture that the inconsistencies from different periods found in the literature on the effects of performance measures such as cash flow, profitability, or q on the risk of takeover may be related to the ephemeral and firm-specific nature of revenue restructuring opportunities, such as developing new technologies or restructuring products.
0%
2 For earlier evidence of changes in the risk-size relationship across time and/or across levels of size, see Herman and Lowenstein (1988 ), Powell (1997 ), Singh (1975 ), and Neumarke and Sharpe (1996 .
3 See Mörck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) for an example of the use of probit models and Palepu (1986) and Barnes (1999) for examples of the use of logit models in the context of takeovers.
The only prior use of hazard models in the study of takeovers was Davis and Stout (1992) and Dickerson et. al. (1998) . Davis and Stout focused on the implications of takeovers for organizational theories of the firm. They did not examine changes in risk across time or levels of performance measures. Dickerson's study focused on dividend policy as the determinant of risk.
They examined changes in marginal risk for dividends and investment only.
6 Some target firms will continue to report financial data to Compustat after a takeover if they have debt securities that remain publicly traded. Observations on known targets that post-date a takeover were excluded from our data set. Most of the firms in the study with initial public offerings after 1980 released some data to Compustat for years prior to the public offering date.
Because those firms are not "at risk" before their initial public offering, those observations were also excluded from the analysis. 7 The study examined every firm in the sample to determine if that firm was involved in a takeover rather than relying on one listing of takeovers. Frydman and Frydman (2000) for the results.)
The same was true in regressions using shareholder returns and labor productivity as determinants of risk (Trimbath (2000a)).
11 Previous studies used the book value of assets (Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) and Cudd and
Duggal (2000)) or market value of equity (Hasbrouck (1985) and Morck, Schleifer and Vishny (1989) ) in nominal dollars to measure size. The book value of assets may fall with depreciation even though the underlying assets remain in use at the firm. Market values are subject to intrafirm variation that may be more closely associated with changes in performance than firm size.
Though sales seem a better measure of firm size and are superior as a direct cost-related indicator of potential short-run efficiency gains, in our sample of firms the three measures of size are highly correlated: the correlation coefficients for sales with assets and market value are 0.87 and 0.68, respectively. The correlation coefficient for assets with market value is 0.67. Moreover, the results concerning the effect of size on the risk of takeover reported in this paper remain virtually unchanged when assets or market value are used as measures of size instead of sales in the estimated hazard models.
12 As we discuss further below, we would expect the potential gains from takeovers of large inefficient firms to be significantly greater than gains from takeovers of smaller firms.
13 See the discussion below in the section on the results of the Cox model and reference therein for a more detailed discussion of the role of size for the risk of takeover.
14 Adjusting the size variable might also obscure its meaning. For example, the adjusted size of a large firm, which is smaller than the median firm in its industry, could be smaller than the adjusted size of a relatively small firm, which is larger than its industry median. However, these cases are rare in our sample and adjusted and unadjusted size variables are highly correlated (the correlation coefficient is 0.999). Furthermore, estimation results for hazard models using an adjusted size variable are very similar to the results reported here. For a detailed analysis of such models, see Trimbath (2000a) . 15 In what follows, note that 1980-1988 observations are used to discuss takeovers completed in [1981] [1982] [1983] [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] . Likewise for the later subperiod. The use of data for the year prior to the takeover is explained in detail in the section on the Cox Regression Model. The year 1988 is not chosen entirely arbitrarily. Structural changes relevant to our selection of this date will be discussed in more detail below. the date allows us to include the sectoral effect in our specification, since time constant variables cannot be estimated in the fixed effects model. 28 The results are not changed when we include dummy variables for target's in the non-cyclical consumer products sector, which was shown in the previous section to have significantly different determinants.
29 Furthermore, our results are not sensitive to the method of payment. We used separate dummy variables for ex post observations where pairs have below and above median changes in debt.
This set of models is designed to control for the effect of takeover financing. A final set of regressions used the actual method of payment as a dummy variable. This set of regressions directly measures the impact of the method of financing (and therefore accounting) on the posttakeover performance of the firms. "Any cash" as the method of payment equates to using purchase accounting for the takeover. The change in debt and the method of payment were considered separately because the entire increase in debt may not be attributed to financing cash payments. The results of the primary model are not changed when controlling for the additional distinctions and are not reported here although they provide some evidence that our measure of
